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From “Capacity” to 
“Capability”
Edwina M. Light, Michael D. 
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Philip Boyce, Terry  
Carney, Alan Rosen,  
Michelle Cleary, Glenn E. 
Hunt, and Nick O’Connor
Abstract: Justifying involuntary psychiatric treatment 
on the basis of a judgment that a person lacks capacity 
is controversial because there are questions about the 
meaning and utility of the concept in this context. There 
are complexities to using capacity in this way, which are 
further amplified in the community outpatient setting 
compared with acute inpatient care. A richer account 
of capacity, its meanings, and practical applications in 
context, is required. This qualitative study sought to 
build inductively a model of capacity in the context of 
involuntary outpatient psychiatric treatment, based on 
38 interviews with stakeholders from New South Wales, 
Australia. The emergent model incorporates multiple 
“capacities”: to manage illness, for self-care, and to 
maintain social roles. It identifies core values that cor-
respond with the “capabilities approach,” elaborating 
the justifications and processes of involuntary outpa-
tient psychiatric treatment. This proposed model of 
“capability” may have a range of benefits to sound and 
ethical practice and scrutiny of systems of involuntary 
outpatient treatment.
Keywords: qualitative research, community mental 
health care, capabilities, ethics, mental health law 
Justifying involuntary psychiatric treat-ment on the basis of a judgment that a person lacks capacity is usually expressed in terms of 
 a person’s ability to make a decision about 
his or her health and treatment. Typically, this 
relates to the ability to refuse treatment. Exactly 
what “capacity” means, however, and how one 
determines when another individual lacks capac-
ity, or lacks sufficient capacity, in this context is 
particularly controversial, with the United Nations 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabili-
ties (2014) insisting that involuntary treatment be 
abandoned altogether and capacity tests avoided.
Capacity is a concept that has multiple mean-
ings and applications across different disciplines 
and settings, including in the context of mental ill-
ness and treatment (Australian Law Reform Com-
mission, 2014; Banner, 2012; Okai et al., 2007; 
Owen, David, et al., 2009; Owen, Freyenhagen, 
Richardson et al., 2009). In clinical and legal do-
mains, capacity is often used synonymously with 
the term “competence” and approaches to both 
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concepts focus on a person’s time and task-specific 
decision-making ability and related processes of 
decision making (Banner, 2012; Doorn, 2011). A 
common approach to assessing decision-making 
capacity in psychiatric and other health care 
settings is a predominantly cognitive-based func-
tional test of the capacity of a person to provide 
valid consent to treatment or refusal of treatment. 
Criteria used in this method seek to determine 
whether a person’s mental impairment makes him 
or her unable to understand information about 
their health and treatment, to retain and use that 
information to make and justify a decision, and 
to communicate a choice about treatment (Doorn, 
2011; Grisso & Appelbaum, 1995; Owen, David, 
et al., 2009; Owen, Freyenhagen, et al., 2009).
Philosophical critiques frequently interrogate 
the moral and political relevance of capacity 
determinations as a justification for coercive use 
of psychiatric power by the state to implement 
psychiatric treatment (Dawson & Kampf, 2006; 
Sullivan & Mullen, 2012; Szmukler & Dawson, 
2011). In this regard, capacity is viewed through 
its interplay with principles of autonomy, be-
neficence, dignity, and equity—specifically, how 
capacity might frame bioethical and human rights 
approaches to involuntary psychiatric treatment 
and how it could protect or enhance relevant 
principles in practice (Australian Law Reform 
Commission, 2014; Doorn, 2011; Owen, David 
et al., 2009; Owen, Freyenhagen et al., 2009). 
In this context, contemporary capacity-based 
justifications for involuntary treatment are often 
contrasted with more traditional legal justifica-
tions based on risk of harm.
Recent proposals for reform in mental health 
law have echoed this philosophical shift, with 
increasing interest in capacity-based criteria for 
involuntary psychiatric treatment in place of 
the traditional risk-based systems (Burns, 2011; 
Fistein et al., 2009; Szmukler & Dawson, 2011). 
There are a number of arguments that would seem 
to justify this proposal. The first is that it would 
make mental health law consistent with other 
capacity-based approaches to health and welfare 
decision making. The second is that it would over-
come many of the drawbacks of risk-based laws, 
which are often seen as discriminatory—stigmatiz-
ing people living with mental illness as dangerous 
and disrespecting their autonomy (Link, Castille, 
& Stuber, 2008; Ryan, Nielssen, Paton, & Large, 
2010; Szmukler & Dawson, 2011). In practical 
terms, laws that take a capacity-based approach to 
involuntary treatment include either those where 
a functional test of decision-making ability is the 
primary feature, those that integrate capacity 
principles with primarily risk-based criteria (Fis-
tein et al., 2009), or those which seek to merge 
capacity and risk criteria together (Szmukler & 
Dawson, 2011).
There are, however, a number of complexi-
ties and contentions associated with the use of 
capacity to justify and operationalize involuntary 
treatment. The current cognitive approach to 
the criteria for capacity testing relies on an as-
sumption that it is “an objectively measurable 
phenomenon” (Banner, 2012, p. 1040; United 
Nations Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, 2014). The reality is that all 
definitions and applications of capacity involve 
intrinsically normative judgments and inevitably 
reflect the influence of context and values (Doorn, 
2011; Radden, 2003; Szmukler & Dawson, 2011). 
Moreover, it is argued that the concept of capac-
ity can be difficult to conceptualize and to put 
into practice, and at times may be misunderstood 
or misapplied (Select Committee on the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, 2014; Williamson, 2011). 
Indeed, a recent review of the Mental Capacity 
Act 2005 (England and Wales) identified these 
issues were part of the poor implementation of 
the act so far: “It is sometimes used to support 
non-intervention or poor care, leaving vulnerable 
adults exposed to risk of harm. In some cases it is 
because professionals struggle to understand how 
to apply the principle in practice” (Select Commit-
tee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, 2014, p. 
8). It is also suggested that changing from risk to 
capacity-based approaches to decision making will 
change the types and rates of use of involuntary 
treatment (Milne, O’Brien, & McKenna, 2009; 
Dawson, 2006), and that this, in turn, may affect 
other social systems (Dawson, 2006).
All these critiques are amplified in the context of 
community-based mental health care. Unlike acute 
and severe disturbances of mental state requiring 
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involuntary inpatient hospital admission, people 
may have variable levels of capacity over longer 
periods of time requiring very different levels of 
care (Szmukler & Dawson, 2011). Recognizing 
the dynamic and context-sensitive nature of ca-
pacity is therefore critical to the long-term care of 
people living with mental illness. This is because 
conceptualization and application of capacity are 
pertinent to how the law and clinicians should 
respond to severe and enduring mental illness in 
the community setting. Furthermore, inappropri-
ate attribution of incapacity to a capable person, 
or vice versa, may undermine their care, dignity, 
and rights (Radden, 2002).
We require an account of capacity in a com-
munity mental health care setting that is richer 
and more contextualized than extant medicolegal 
and theoretical constructs (Doorn, 2011; Owen, 
Freyenhagen, et al., 2009; Szmukler & Dawson, 
2011). Most data about capacity relates to the 
setting of severe and psychotic mental illness. 
Moreover, decisions about capacity in ambula-
tory psychiatric care are more complex than acute 
inpatient care, where the critical issue is usually 
dangerousness or risk of harm. Capacity may be 
understood and applied in different ways by dif-
ferent professionals, which in turn affects patients 
and carers. We, therefore, require data that help 
to provide a better understanding of capacity in 
the setting of severe and persistent mental illness 
and its ongoing management in the community. 
In light of this imperative, this qualitative study 
aimed to derive a comprehensive model of capacity 
in involuntary outpatient treatment that is credible 
and meaningful among patients, caregivers, clini-
cians, and legal decision makers, and better reflects 
the ways that capacity is constructed in clinical 
practice, policy and law. The inductive nature of 
qualitative research, where no prior assumptions 
are made about findings and where analysis is open 
to emergent issues, is well-suited to examining real 
world constructions of complex concepts such as 
capacity and experiences of complex processes, 
such as involuntary psychiatric treatment in the 
community setting.
Methods
This qualitative study was conducted in New 
South Wales (NSW), Australia, and referred to 
involuntary outpatient “community treatment 
orders” (CTOs) under the Mental Health Act 
2007 (NSW). The preliminary findings of the study 
were submitted as a report to the funding body 
and published online; however, this paper provides 
a more substantive and extended descriptive and 
philosophical account of the research findings and 
develops a normative alternative to the current 
conceptualization of capacity. Like other Austra-
lian and many international jurisdictions, NSW 
involuntary treatment law currently provides 
that unconsented psychiatric treatment cannot be 
delivered unless, owing to a mental illness (as de-
fined in the act), a person requires protection from 
serious harm to self or others and that involuntary 
treatment represents the least restrictive route to 
safe and effective care. Recent reforms have added 
capacity considerations to the principles that are to 
be put in to practice in the care and treatment of 
people under the Act. Decisions on CTO applica-
tions are made by an independent Mental Health 
Review Tribunal (MHRT), based on applications 
from a clinician, a mental health facility director, 
and/or a primary carer of a person.
This study examined clinical and legal CTO 
decision making and patient and carer lived ex-
periences. It aimed to inductively build a model of 
“capacity” in the context of CTOs (as well as mod-
els of “risk” and people’s lived experiences, which 
are reported elsewhere; Light et al., 2014; Light et 
al., 2015) and to identify potential improvements 
to CTO processes. The research questions were 
formulated as: How do mental health profession-
als, patients, caregivers, and legal decision makers 
conceptualize “capacity” in the context of deci-
sions about involuntary psychiatric treatment in 
the community setting? and Can a comprehensive 
model of “capacity” that is consensually valid 
across participant groups be formulated?
Participants and Recruitment
Participants were recruited using a theoretical, 
purposive method of sampling, and comprised 
four groups: patients currently or previously on 
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a CTO, relatives or carers of a person subject to 
a CTO, community mental health clinicians, and 
members of the legal body oversighting involun-
tary psychiatric treatment (the MHRT).
The investigators sought to build a maximum 
variation, rather than representative, sample in 
which as many different subgroups of different 
participant groups are included. This does not 
allow justification of claims to generalizability of 
study findings. Rather, it enabled the investiga-
tors to describe and understand a rich and varied 
range of experiences and perspectives and to build 
a comprehensive model of capacity in the context 
of involuntary psychiatric treatment in a com-
munity setting. In the patient and carer groups, 
the study aimed to recruit people with current or 
past experience CTOs, those ordered in different 
geographic locations, or those relating to people 
with different diagnoses of mental illness. The 
study also sought to include participants from 
different disciplines and professional histories in 
the clinician and MHRT member groups.
Recruitment involved a variety of methods. 
Clinicians were recruited through distribution of 
an invitation issued by NSW health service man-
agers. Potential participants (clinicians) were also 
recruited using the “snowball” method, through 
which the study was recommended to subsequent 
participants through professional networks or 
relationships. In the case of patient and carer 
participants, an invitation was circulated through 
non-government organizations (Carers NSW, the 
Mental Health Coordinating Council, and NSW 
Consumer Advisory Group—Mental Health Inc.). 
This was further disseminated through their own 
networks and individual recommendations. Pa-
tient and carer participants received $40 at inter-
view toward costs of participation. In the case of 
MHRT participants, the invitation was circulated 
by the tribunal to all members. All consumer par-
ticipants were clinically stable at the time of their 
participation and were judged to have sufficient 
capacity to freely participate in this research. Their 
expressions and views were valid irrespective of 
whether they were on a CTO or not.
After provision of a participant information 
statement, and an opportunity for questions 
about the project and the conduct of interviews, 
written informed consent was obtained from each 
participant. The research was conducted with the 
approval of the following committees: University 
of Sydney Human Research Ethics Committee 
(patient and carer interviews—protocol number 
12583; MHRT member interviews—protocol 
number 14421); Sydney Local Health Network 
Ethics Review Committee (protocol number 
X10–0338).
Data Collection and Analysis
The investigators conducted in-depth semis-
tructured interviews in a variety of sites. In the 
case of clinician participants, interviews were 
conducted in clinical sites. MHRT participants 
were interviewed either at the MHRT offices or, 
where appropriate, in their other workplaces. In-
terviews with patient and carer participants were 
held in offices of non-government organizations. 
Patient participants were not recruited from or 
interviewed in clinical settings because the in-
vestigators sought to maintain a clear distinction 
between their voluntary participation in the study 
and their involuntary treatment status.
In the conduct of the interviews, the investiga-
tors prompted the participants to speak about 
their unique understanding of CTO use by 
providing narrative accounts of their experience 
of CTO processes. In the case of clinicians or 
MHRT participants, this involved their reflection 
on specific examples of decisions around CTOs 
in their professional experience. In the case of 
patients and carers, this involved a process of 
constructing a personal narrative of their direct 
and indirect experiences of the use of CTOs. The 
interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and 
de-identified. The data were managed using the 
NVIVO9 computer program.
The analysis utilized grounded theory and in-
ductive methods as described by Charmaz (2006), 
Corbin and Strauss (2008), and Thomas (2006). 
Using an a priori code of “capacity,” this involved 
an initial coding process to sort and begin an 
analytic account of the data, then the synthesis of 
the coding into more conceptually complete cat-
egories. As the iterative process of data collection 
and analysis progressed, data and codes within 
and between interviews were constantly compared 
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and memos written to analyze the nature of and 
relationships between codes and emerging catego-
ries. This facilitated the emergence of a number 
of themes, which formed the basis of the model 
of capacity. The investigators sought to confirm 
data saturation by triangulation of the data coded 
separately by two members of the team (M.R. and 
E.L.) and through discussion of the data among 
the investigators and stakeholder reference group 
members. Triangulation is an intrinsic aspect of 
qualitative research used to establish validity and 
completeness of an analysis and can involve use 
of different investigators and stakeholders (as 
this study did), data sources, study theories, and/




Five patients and six carers participated in 
interviews. Six were men and five women from 
metropolitan or regional/rural areas. Among ei-
ther the patients or the relative of the carer were 
diagnoses of schizophrenia, depression, bipolar 
disorder, and anxiety. All of the CTOs under dis-
cussion were initiated from a hospital, although 
renewals of CTOs in a community setting were 
also discussed at interview. Six of the interviews 
related to CTOs currently in place, and the other 
CTOs had either lapsed or the status of the CTO 
was unknown to the interviewee. One issue of note 
was the difficulties in recruiting patients subject 
to CTOs through non-clinical pathways. In opt-
ing not to recruit through treating clinicians, the 
yield of suitable participants was lower than an-
ticipated. Moreover, several suitable participants 
later withdrew or were unable to participate.
Twelve MHRT members participated in the 
interviews. Of these five were women and seven 
were men. Four were psychiatrists, four were 
lawyers, and four were from social work, nursing, 
psychology, and mental health service adminis-
tration fields. Fifteen clinicians participated in 
interviews; three psychiatrists, eight nurses, two 
social workers, one psychologist, and one occu-
pational therapist (four men and eleven women). 
The various clinicians had worked in inpatient and 
community mental health settings and their clinical 
loads included general adult mental health, youth 
mental health, older person’s mental health, and 
Aboriginal mental health. Participants worked in 
regional and metropolitan settings.
Perspectives on Capacity
Analysis of participant accounts of “capac-
ity” revealed a range of practical and conceptual 
themes. It also found significant overlaps in how 
groups of participants think about “capacity,” 
although each group emphasized different aspects 
of it. This may have been because ideas about what 
gives life meaning are broadly shared and derive 
from sedimented values and norms (Nussbaum & 
Sen, 1993). Alternatively, this may have reflected 
the influence of hegemonic institutional norms. 
This necessitated our acknowledgement that many 
participants may have been speaking of socially 
constructed and nomothetic notions of the good 
life. Clinicians and MHRT member views were 
often based on legal and medical constructions 
relating to the ability to make decisions about 
health and treatment. They often raised epistemic 
concerns about how to conceptualize capacity, and 
were mindful of the different discourses around 
the phenomenon, including in their own ways of 
thinking. Many patients and caregivers shared 
these perspectives, but overall were more likely to 
emphasize capacities to manage illness and how 
severe mental illness often impaired capacity to 
pursue life goals and partake a social role. As the 
analysis progressed, these discourses on capacity 
were systematically integrated to derive a model of 
capacity in the context of outpatient involuntary 
psychiatric treatment.
The model of capacity identified three domains: 
“manage illness,” “self-care,” and “maintain 
social roles.”
Manage illness. The capacity to manage one’s 
mental illness was a key feature of perspectives on 
capacity among all participant groups. It incorpo-
rated the ability to recognize the features of illness, 
including early signs of recurrence; acknowledge 
the effect of illness on thought, emotion, and be-
havior; engage and negotiate with a clinical service 
and domains of treatment (including awareness of 
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potential benefits and harms from psychotropic 
treatments); and participate in a “recovery”-based 
model of care.
Clinicians described this capacity in both con-
ceptual and practical terms. Conceptual capac-
ity—akin to the medicolegal construct usually used 
to assess competence in various domains—related 
to a person’s ability to conceptualize and articulate 
choices about their illness management. Central to 
this were capabilities such as cognitive function, 
judgment or insight into consequences of various 
choices.
And there’s a difference when they’re actually able 
to cope, to have a life, to deal with their children, to 
deal with their partners, to go to work, all those things 
are signposts that things are getting better, and they can 
reflect, ‘I couldn’t do that then, but I can now.’ (Clini-
cian participant)
Practical capacity concerned how a person 
might deal with the daily demands of living in the 
community and included negotiating to have one’s 
needs met within complex systems such as health 
and social services—making and communicating 
choices, and sustaining social supports. Some 
clinicians saw the utility of CTOs in prioritizing 
the needs of patients when illness may have ad-
versely affected their ability to access or engage 
with treatment services.
when somebody is on a community treatment order, 
the system expects you to keep working with them... 
they have the safeguard of getting a certain priority—
you’re not going to discharge them because you’ve got 
too many clients, that sort of priority. So it’s an obli-
gation from the mental health service’s point of view. 
(Clinician participant)
MHRT member participants had similar per-
spectives on capacity to manage illness, including 
the themes of dealing with the intrinsic limitations 
of severe mental illness (frequently focused on 
legalistic questions of mental capacity to decide 
about treatment and of what is often called “lack 
of insight”) and of those presented by the mental 
health system (and in which CTOs acted as a form 
of advocacy for patient need).
The capacity to manage mental illness was a 
prominent theme among patient and carer per-
spectives on capacity. This included “knowing 
the illness”: recognizing signs of deterioration in 
heath, and learning the effect of certain treatments 
on symptoms; understanding the language and 
processes of mental health care including diag-
noses, treatments, and health services, as well as 
involuntary treatment; and recognizing the need 
for knowledge and/or advocacy to participate in 
these health and medicolegal systems.
Because it [the medication] takes about two or three 
weeks to work …it really takes a long time. And I’m 
glad I take the tablets, I don’t want to take the injection, 
because with the tablets I know I’ve got it every day, I 
know it’s in my system. (Patient participant)
He said, “I respond to my old medication, so that’s 
what I think I need.” So he’s very, very smart. And 
there was some medication they wanted to put him 
on, and he refused, he said ‘I don’t want that.’ And he 
does research himself, so he’s read the Mental Health 
Act and everything. So he knows what works for him. 
(Carer participant)
Being able to communicate about the illness 
was an integral part of this capacity, particularly 
to engage with clinicians about treatment and/or 
in involuntary treatment processes. The concept 
of “recovery,” as against other forms of improve-
ment, was also evident in many consumer and 
carer perspectives on managing illness. The tenets 
of the “recovery approach”—including hope, 
secure base, self, supportive relationships, em-
powerment and inclusion, coping strategies, and 
meaning—may have influenced some participants, 
whereas others may have seen this in simple terms 
of optimism or hope. Patient participants spoke 
about aspirational goals of recovery from illness 
as well as short-term and longer term goals for 
symptom control or restoring vocational roles.
I think I’m going to learn to live with it, and live 
with it well, because I’m 42 and I’m quite healthy for 
my age, and I’m not silly, I reckon I can go back to work 
in a couple of years when I get stronger, and that’s my 
goal…it made me realize that hey you know, I can get 
rid of this illness; or not get rid of it, but I can stop the 
voices. And that was the main thing, the voices was the 
main thing. (Patient participant)
Self-care. Being able to care for one’s self 
emerged in the capacity discourses of all par-
ticipant groups, referring to a person’s ability to 
maintain physical well-being and healthy lifestyle 
choices, and to establish and maintain a suitable 
personal environment as well as a network of 
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professional and interpersonal caregivers. Patient 
and carer participant accounts highlighted that 
being able to cope with the effects of illness, to 
meet interpersonal and health needs, and to live 
independently in the community were importance 
aspects of self-care. Severe mental illness could 
disrupt this capacity, either through the problems 
of disorganization, apathy, amotivation, or avoli-
tion or through the disruptive effects of psychosis.
So the simple thing like going to buy food, it’s just 
everything you know. If he’s so disturbed by the voices, 
he’ll just have to lay down on the bed and stay there, he 
just can’t do anything. (Carer participant)
MHRT member accounts included similar 
quality-of-life themes and explained how the 
absence of capacity for self-care emerged as the 
propensity for neglect (for example, of personal 
care or living conditions), which was a concept 
that frequently featured in deliberations on ques-
tions of involuntary community treatment.
Some case managers are very close to their clients, 
and they go and visit the client, with their permission 
of course, just to ensure that they are taking their medi-
cation.…But you will have a sense of how the client is 
living in the home environment, so whether the place 
is looked after, whether the client’s done the washing, 
see whether there are dishes in the sink, and talk to the 
neighbors, they will give you an indication as to whether 
or not they have received any complaints; take a walk 
with them down the street to the café that they go to, 
you get a sense of their surroundings as well, moving 
away from the home to a place outside. So those sorts 
of things come into play [in CTO decision-making]. 
(MHRT member participant)
Clinicians also regarded the impairment of the 
capacity to prioritize and maintain self-care as a 
significant concern in considerations of treating 
severe mental illness. In addition to attending to in-
strumental needs, some clinicians also saw that an 
aspiration of treatment was to facilitate the plea-
surable or hedonic experience of participating in 
different aspects of life. One clinician participant 
regarded the consumer’s perspective of what hap-
piness they sought from life as an important focus 
of care: “I think first of all I’d want to know what 
the client considers important to their happiness 
and well-being, and that’s different for everyone.”
Maintain social roles. Participant perspec-
tives on capacity also depicted the capability to 
maintain social roles. This included being able to 
establish and maintain interpersonal, vocational, 
and educational functioning; to meet obligations 
to others in the community; and to maintain har-
monious and nurturing relationships with family, 
friends, and acquaintances.
Throughout their interviews, patient and carer 
participants spoke about the disabling effects of se-
vere illness on a person’s ability to pursue life goals 
and engage in a social role. These goal-focused 
capacities included establishing and maintaining 
relationships, which provided scope for support 
and interpersonal networks; seeking and maintain-
ing financial independence; participating in educa-
tion and employment; and fulfilling obligations 
to others (whether it be interpersonal, financial, 
or community relationships). Many such goals 
related to personal achievements and milestones, 
or more generally to being able to survive and 
flourish in the community.
I go to work and get sick and then I come back and 
then I’m not able to function as well as I could and I 
lose my job. (Patient participant)
A carer participant highlighted how the effects 
of severe mental illness meant that, for some 
people, programs to support people’s social par-
ticipation—such as peer support or employment 
programs—were still out of reach:
I know from speaking to other people, other parents, 
that they feel the same as I do about their son. You’ve 
got to be pretty high functioning to go and join most of 
these groups, and most of them aren’t. So the resources 
are there … but they’re not meeting the needs of every-
one, it’s only a small functioning group that are using 
them. (Carer participant)
MHRT member and clinician accounts also 
explored how illness frequently disrupted a per-
son’s practical capacity and ability to maintain a 
social role. Practical capacity involved being able 
to apply skills in dealing with the complexities of 
the social system—comparable with the notions 
of “phronesis” (Kraut, 2014) and the capacity to 
partake in citizenship—and was part of some of 
the considerations about treatment aims.
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This woman was a registered nurse, and very smart 
lady and she had a husband, she had children, before 
the illness debilitated her. So we want to get … [her] 
involved with society, because she’s very withdrawn. 
(Clinician participant)
Some participants also commented on the 
sometimes profoundly disabling effects of “nega-
tive symptoms” of illness, which might undermine 
other people’s perceptions of the credibility of a 
person’s plans for themselves or destabilize their 
fulfilment of expressed intentions to engage in life.
Look I don’t think you can order people to go to 
TAFE [technical and further education], one of the prob-
lems, particularly with schizophrenia for example, is 
you have people with prominent negative symptoms,…
Their executive functioning skills and planning skills are 
so impaired, even if they know what would be a good 
thing for them, they just can’t quite organize it. (MHRT 
member participant)
As part of deliberations on such issues, some 
clinicians recognized the need for a patient to 
have the capacity to manage the adversity often 
brought into their lives by illness, particularly to 
manage losses such as the loss of agency, social 
role, or status.
Discussion
This study sought to describe how patients, car-
ers, clinicians, and MHRT members conceptualize 
“capacity” and to use this empirical data to derive 
a model of capacity in the context of involuntary 
psychiatric treatment in the community setting. 
The model of capacity described incorporates a 
person’s multiple capacities to manage illness, 
for self-care, and to maintain social roles. It is 
grounded in the participants’ lived experiences of 
many aspects of severe mental illness and of out-
patient involuntary psychiatric treatment. It was 
noteworthy that many participants were aware 
of, and thoughtful about, the epistemic, ethical, 
policy, and practical issues associated with the 
conceptualization and application of capacity, 
including functional capacity testing and possible 
approaches to mental health law. What emerged 
in our findings, however, were broader concerns 
about the extant conceptualization and construc-
tion of capacity in this setting. As such, they offer a 
number of opportunities to reappraise the practical 
application of “capacity” in this particular con-
text, as well as helping to frame debate on relevant 
ethical and policy concerns. No qualitative work 
can make claims to generalizability; however, this 
research indicates dissonance between the tradi-
tional cognitive approach of “capacity” and the, 
arguably idiographic, expanded notion of capacity 
described by this group. Within the setting of in-
voluntary psychiatric treatment in the community 
in NSW, the traditional cognitive-focused notion 
of capacity was an incomplete account of what all 
participants conceptualized.
Decision Making about Involuntary 
Outpatient Psychiatric Treatment
Capacity figures significantly in clinical and 
legal approaches to the treatment (voluntary and 
involuntary) of people living with severe and 
enduring mental illnesses. Our account of a “real-
world” model of capacity, that is particular to 
involuntary psychiatric treatment in the commu-
nity, improves our understanding of how people 
think about and apply this concept in practice. The 
model incorporates the wide range of perspectives 
held among different stakeholders, each of whom 
bring diverse and overlapping experiences to bear 
on their understandings of capacity. It also accom-
modates both points of agreement and divergence 
and as such provides a robust framework to im-
prove applications of capacity in this setting. The 
model was developed by careful identification of 
points of overlap among participant groups and 
consideration of the origins of points of difference 
from epistemic and ontological perspectives. In 
doing so, it provides a possible mechanism for 
improving communication between patients, fami-
lies, clinicians, and tribunal members about the 
rationale for and limits of involuntary treatment 
in community settings, including the articulation 
of treatment goals and plans that are implemented 
under involuntary orders. It could also increase 
the transparency and accountability of decisions 
about involuntary (and voluntary) treatment and 
the systems through which they are implemented. 
Indeed, by explicitly incorporating multiple do-
mains of capacity, this model would make these 
processes more inclusive, dynamic, and context 
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specific. Each of the capacity domains would not 
have the same significance in every situation and 
with every patient. Rather, the weight attached to 
each capacity domain would depend on who it 
involves (e.g., the patient, the carer, the clinician, 
or legal decision maker) and the context (e.g., the 
clinical diagnoses, history, or setting).
Importantly, we believe the instrumental value 
of this model of capacity has potential in any 
jurisdiction, regardless of its specific legislative 
criteria for decisions about involuntary commu-
nity treatment. Whether laws are predominately 
risk based (as was the setting of this empirical 
study) or use forms of functional decision-making 
capacity testing, this model is useful to improving 
communication between stakeholders, treatment 
planning, and the transparency of these processes. 
Research into decision making under mental 
health legislation shows that the complexity of 
such processes can lead to decision makers sub-
stituting their own criteria for the statutory crite-
ria, based on an analysis of what lay behind the 
intentions of the law (Perkins, 2011). The results 
of this study help us to understand what is in the 
minds of decision makers and suggest that, even 
when mindful of statutory criteria, stakeholders 
are able to articulate and engage with other mat-
ters, including the health and social context in 
which such legal decisions are embedded (Carney 
& Beaupert, 2008). In addition, the model that 
we have proposed may also be useful in elaborat-
ing areas of the currently applied capacity testing 
criteria that are contested and complex (Banner, 
2012; Doorn, 2011; Szmukler & Dawson, 2011), 
by depicting some of the values and context rel-
evant to deliberations over involuntary outpatient 
psychiatric treatment.
In promoting the benefits of an empirically 
derived model of capacity, it is important to dis-
tinguish it from conceptualizations of risk of harm 
as the moral justification for coercive psychiatric 
treatment. In this regard, it is noteworthy that all 
of the participants in this qualitative study spoke 
of the risks of harm faced and posed by people liv-
ing in the community with a severe and persistent 
mental illness (Light et al., 2015). Yet they readily 
distinguished this from the disabilities or incapaci-
ties consequent upon such an illness.
Capacity or “Capability”?
Our examination of the lived experiences and 
perspectives of involuntary psychiatric treatment 
in the community demonstrates how often and 
how differently the notion of capacity arises in 
health care decision making and why a richer un-
derstanding of the concept is necessary for sound 
and ethical practice.
What is, perhaps, most striking about our data 
is that the model of capacity that emerges is not 
defined solely in the type of cognitive terms that 
dominate traditional medicolegal constructions of 
capacity and accepted processes of substituted or 
proxy decision making. The model that emerges 
from our research describes a series of capabili-
ties that extend the traditional cognitive-focused 
approaches of “capacity.” We believe that by 
privileging cognitive capability over others, the 
‘capacity’ approach is only a partial account of 
what this group of participants conceptualize 
when deliberating questions in community men-
tal health care. Its dimensions of interpersonal 
efficacy, self-respect, self-care, and engaging in a 
social role direct us toward a notion of the “telos” 
or purposes of psychiatric treatment and the no-
tion of a basic ethic of the psychiatric project. 
This poses the question: What is it that we seek 
to achieve through psychiatric treatment? Implicit 
in the narratives of the participants was that the 
aspiration of coercive treatment should be to 
restore and scaffold fundamental capabilities to 
pursue a “good life,” however socially constructed 
and contextualized. This would seem to be a lib-
eral egalitarian perspective, as described by John 
Rawls (1971). This invites our reconsideration 
of the goals of mental health care—specifically, 
whether treatment of psychiatric disorder serves 
as a means of redressing the imbalances brought 
about by “the natural lottery” (Daniels 1985). In 
other words, whether coercive psychiatric treat-
ment should be instrumental in compensating for 
the effects of severe mental illness on a person’s 
ability to vie for social goods and to pursue a 
life’s journey.
Our results suggest there may be merit in re-
framing or extending the notion of capacity(s) in 
this context in terms of capability(s), as outlined 
by Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum’s elaboration of 
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Rawls and of Amartya Sen’s capabilities approach 
to welfare economics and human development 
(Sen, 1985) provides a conceptual framework 
to situate our emergent theory of the purpose of 
psychiatric treatment. Nussbaum describes ten 
capabilities that are necessary for one to live a life 
with dignity—using this to provide an account of 
the fundamental sociopolitical entitlements that 
are central to the liberal egalitarian conception 
of social justice: life; bodily health; bodily integ-
rity; senses, imagination, and thought; emotions; 
practical reason; affiliation; other species; play; 
and control over one’s environment (political and 
material) (Nussbaum, 2006). These seem to be uni-
versalist assumptions; they have broad empirical 
support from studies in diverse communities and 
cultures (Nussbaum & Sen, 1993) and it is difficult 
to envisage a historical or cultural setting where 
these were not instrumental goods. In her writing, 
Nussbaum describes the implications that the ca-
pability approach would have for the development 
of policies concerning disability (including people 
with “mental impairment” or “mental disability”), 
noting that public policy would need to facilitate 
and protect a person’s access to the capabilities 
while leaving the individual concerned the choice 
about whether to exercise or realize those capa-
bilities. Thus, where a person needs assistance a 
capabilities approach would mandate that this 
should be provided in such a way that invites 
the person to participate as much as possible in 
decision making and choices. This would seem 
to parallel the commonly held view that coercive 
psychiatric treatment, ultimately, aspires to enable 
the patient to exercise a right to negative liberty 
through realization of autonomous choice. Impor-
tantly, when using the terms “mental impairment” 
and “mental disability,” Nussbaum explains that 
she is referring to the terrain occupied by both 
“cognitive” disabilities and “mental illnesses” 
(Nussbaum, 2006, p. 423). Further, she argues 
that the “lives of citizens with mental impairments, 
and of those who care for them, will continue to 
be unusually difficult lives. …[T]he lives of either 
people with disabilities or their caregivers need not 
contain the stigma and insult and the inordinate 
burdens that they used to contain ubiquitously, 
and now often still contain” (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 
222). As such, her thesis is that a “decent” society 
will organize public policy that is supportive and 
inclusive of such lives, avoids further marginal-
izing and stigmatizing, and gives people as much 
access to the capabilities as possible. This idea is 
particularly salient with regards to involuntary 
psychiatric treatment, where stigma remains a 
feature of the experience of severe and persistent 
mental illness and its treatment (Goffman, 1963; 
Link et al., 2008).
Capabilities and Mental Health
The capabilities approach has been applied 
worldwide in numerous mental and public health 
projects, including work to devise new ways of 
measuring outcome in public and social health 
programs. In an ongoing project seeking to op-
erationalize the capabilities approach to welfare 
economics, Anand et al. (2013) have developed 
a variety of ways in which capabilities can be 
measured, including applications to health out-
comes measurement. In an adaption of this work, 
Lorgelly, Lorimer, Fenwick, and Briggs (2008) 
used the capability approach to develop an instru-
ment for evaluating public health interventions. 
They posited that complex social and public health 
interventions have a diverse range of outcomes not 
captured by the quality-adjusted life-years frame-
work commonly used in health economics, and 
found the capability approach offered a richer set 
of dimensions. Simon et al. also adapted Anand’s 
work to develop a capabilities-based instrument 
that would enable a more comprehensive measure-
ment of important mental health outcomes as part 
of their study of CTOs in England. Their initial 
evaluation seems to demonstrate the feasibility and 
validity of directly utilizing measures of human 
capabilities as an approach to measurement of 
outcome in psychiatric care. Each of the projects 
has sought to find instruments able to account 
for all of the outcomes of “interest/importance” 
in health care (Lorgelly et al., 2008), arguing that 
capabilities-based tools provide such a measure.
The capabilities approach has value and utility 
in mental health well beyond the assessment of 
health care interventions, providing the basis for 
rigorous reconceptualizations of key concepts in 
the field such as “social integration” and “recov-
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ery.” Ware et al, for example, used it as a frame-
work to address the continuing social exclusion 
of people living with mental illness, providing 
the basis for an approach to social integration 
which casts persons with psychiatric disabilities 
as social agents and envisions flourishing, rather 
than simple functioning, as an outcome (Ware, 
Hopper, Tugenberg, Dickey, & Fisher, 2007). 
Similarly, Hopper (2007) uses the capabilities ap-
proach to inform a new approach to “recovery,” 
arguing that a capabilities-informed mental health 
program enables people to thrive, not just survive: 
by re-enfranchising agency, redressing material 
and symbolic disadvantage, and raising the bar 
on fundamental entitlements.
In our findings, participant perspectives of “ca-
pacity” and involuntary outpatient treatment were 
frequently concerned with impairments of capa-
bilities arising from mental illness that precluded 
or compromised a dignified life. The model that 
we propose identifies core values that correspond 
with Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and other’s 
efforts to apply it in certain contexts. It enlightens 
our understanding of how the state’s intervention 
in the lives of some citizens—in this case involun-
tary outpatient treatment—might seek to protect 
or restore a person’s agency (in the health care 
system, in society): seeking to mitigate the effects 
of mental illness and enable a person’s capability 
to maintain well-being, to experience pleasure, 
pursue a life’s journey, maintain interpersonal 
supportive relationships, manage the adversity 
often brought into one’s life owing to illness (such 
as loss of agency, social role, or status), and civic 
participation seem to be the moral foundation of 
that intervention.
This proposed model of “capability” in the 
context of involuntary outpatient psychiatric 
treatment moves beyond current medicolegal 
constructs of task-specific assessment of compe-
tence in relation to treatment decisions and may 
have a range of benefits: improving communica-
tion between stakeholders, providing a more 
comprehensive framework for decision making 
about involuntary orders and specified treatment 
plans, and improving the transparency of those 
processes. Perhaps most important, we believe 
that this model may also increase scrutiny on the 
justifications for and implementation of systems of 
involuntary outpatient treatment. What cannot be 
justified by this research is the use of the capabili-
ties approach as criteria to determine when coer-
cion or usurpation of negative rights is justified.
There is currently no clear consensus about the 
instrumental value of CTOs and what we seek 
to achieve by using them. These are not simply 
“medical” questions, but ethical ones, because 
the outcomes we privilege—whether traditional 
measures of efficacy and effectiveness such as 
avoiding hospital readmissions, reducing hospital 
stays, improving quality-adjusted life-years, or 
stabilizing people’s health to enable illness insight 
or treatment engagement, prioritizing community-
based over hospital-based coercive treatment, 
prompting a health system response—reflect our 
ideas about what it is that “matters” and what it is 
we want our mental health care system to achieve 
(Light, 2014). Of course, this many not simply 
be a question of what we want from our mental 
health care system, but what goals we also want 
social and welfare systems to fulfil in this context. 
The answers to these questions should not be de-
termined solely by health professionals or regula-
tors, but through a broad public debate informed 
by a genuine understanding of the experiences of 
those who suffer severe mental illness and those 
who provide care for them or deliberate legally 
and clinically over their lives. The “capability” 
model, as a means of understanding both a moral 
justification of involuntary psychiatric treatment 
and the telos of psychiatric treatment, elaborates 
what the community values as important in the 
provision of healthcare for those living with severe 
and enduring mental illness.
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